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Ten Years After Weingarten:
Are the Standards
Really Clear?
DANIEL

I.

J.

HERRON*

INTRODUCTION

Succinctly (and perhaps superficially) stated, the U.S. Supreme
Court in NLRB v. Weingarten, lnc.,1 enforced an NLRB ruling
which recognized the right of an employee under section 7 of the
National Labor Relations Act 2 to upon request, engage in concerted
activities for mutual aid or protection by having present a union
representative at an investigatory interview with management when
the employee reasonably believes that disciplinary action may occur
or result. Specifically, this case indicated that interference with the
rights of employees under certain circumstances to engage in concerted
activities constituted an unfair labor practice under section 8(a)(l).
The ruling poses four immediate questions that courts have been
struggling with for the past nine years: 1) the definition of "reasonably
believes"; 2) what constitutes "concerted activities for mutual aid or
protection"; 3) role of the requested representative; and 4) the definition of an "investigatory interview." The Supreme Court, however,
in enforcing the Board's ruling also adopted the rationale that the
"exercise of the right may not interfere with legitimate employer
prerogatives." Thus, not only must the courts wrestle with the four
immediate questions as posed above, but they also must balance this
new employee right with "legitimate employer prerogatives." Therefore,
* Assistant Professor, Department of Business Administration, University of
Wyoming, Laramie, Wyoming. J.D.: Case Western Reserve University; B.A., Miami
University.
1. 420 U.S. 251 (1975).
2. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1947). (NLRA § 7) [hereinafter NLRAJ specifically states:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist
labor organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose
of ,;;ollective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall have
the right to refrain from any or all of such activities except to the extent
that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in
a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section
158(a)(3) of this title.
3. 485 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1973).
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what may be a statutory due process right for the employee becomes
a burden for the employer. The courts are thus required to draw a
balance between the two.

II.
A.

BACKGROUND

WEINGARTEN ISSUE

Weingarten, Inc. operates a chain of retail stores. Based upon
employee reports, the management investigated employee Leora Collins
for possible theft and cash register shortages.• Collins and other sales
personnel were represented collectively by the Retail Clerks Union. 5
During her interview with the store manager and company investigator,
Collins repeatedly asked for a shop steward or union representative
to be present. Collins' requests were denied. 6 The investigations and
subsequent interview exonerated Collins of her purported wrongdoing. 7
After her examination, Collins reported the content of her interview to her shop steward. Based upon management's denial of Collins' requests for union representation during the interview, the union
filed an unfair labor practice proceeding against the company with
the NLRB. 8
The Board ruled against the company and formulated what now
is ref erred to as the Weingarten right. 9 However, on appeal, the Fifth
Circuit refused enforcement of the Board's ruling, 10 citing what is
characterized as an indisputable "long line of Board decisions, each
of which indicates-either directly or indirectly-that no union
representative need be present at an investigatory interview.'' 11

4. NLRB v. Weingarten, Inc., 420 U.S. 251, 254 (1975).
5. Id.
6. Id. at 255.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 256.
9. Id.
10. 485 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1973).
1 I. 420 U.S. 251, 264 (1975) (citing Weingarten, 485 F.2d 1135, 1137 (5th Cir.
1973)).
We agree that its NLRB's earlier precedents do not impair the validity of
the Board's construction. That construction in no wise exceeds the reach
of § 7 [of the NLRA], but falls well within the scope of the rights created
by that section. Cf. note 1 supra. The use by an administrative agency of
the evolutional approach is particularly fitting. To hold that the Board's
earlier decisions froze the development of this important aspect of the
national labor law would misconceive the nature of administrative decision
making ....
Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 265-66.
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However, the Supreme Court held, in essence, that prior Board
decisions are not binding upon the Board if the Board has a reasonable
basis for its "new" decision and if its reasonable basis falls within
the statutory authority afforded the Board by Congress. 12 Moreover,
it is not the province of the courts to enforce Board precedents, but
merely to determine whether the Board has acted within its statutorily
authorized discretion.
8.

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF NLRB DECISIONS

This "abuse of discretion" 13 approach that the Supreme Court
developed for the review of NLRB (if not all administrative agencies)
decisions has been clarified and reinforced time and time again. Yet,
the Court has remained ever mindful, at least in passing, that the
Board must continually balance employees' statutory rights and
employers' legitimate prerogatives. In Beth Israel Hospital v. NLRB, 14
the Supreme Court cited a 1956 case, NLRB v. Babcock and Wilcox
Co.,' 5 stating "accommodation between [employee-organization rights
and employer-property rights] must be obtained with as little destruction of one as is consistent with the maintenance of the other." 16
Yet that "accommodation" remains primarily a Board function, for
[it] is the Board on which Congress conferred the authority to develop
and apply fundamental national labor policy. Because it is to the
Board that Congress entrusted the task of "applying the Act's general
prohibitory language in the light of the infinite combinations of
events which might be charged as violative of its terms" . . . that
body, if it is to accomplish the task which Congress set for it,
necessarily must have authority to formulate rules to fill the interstices
of the broad statutory provisions."
12. It is the province of the Board, not the courts, to determine whether
or not the "need" exists in light of changing industrial practices .... For
the Board has the 'special function of applying the general provisions of
the Act (NLRA) to the complexities of indusrrial life' (citations omitted) ....
Reviewing courts are of course not 'to stand aside and rubber stamp' Board
determinations that run contrary to the language or tenor of the act (citation omitted) ... the Board's construction here, while it may not be required
by the Act, is at least permissible under it ....
Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 266-67.
13. Id.
14. 437 U.S. 483 (1978).
15. 351 U.S. 105 (1956).
16. Beth Israel Hosp. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 483, 492 (1977) (citing NLRB v.
Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956)).
17. Beth Israel Hosp., 437 U.S. at 500-01 (citing Republic Aviation Corp. v.
NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 798 (1945)).
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Moreover, the Supreme Court had recognized and adopted the
Board's "evolutional approach" 18 as the appropriate method m
developing labor policy. As was emphasized in Weingarten:
To hold that the Board's earlier decisions froze the development of this important aspect of the national labor law would
misconceive the nature of administrative decision making.
"Cumulative experience" begets understanding and insight by which
judgments ... are validated or qualified or invalidated. The constant
process of trial and error, on a wider and fuller scale than a single
advisory litigation permits, differentiates perhaps more than anything
else the administrative from the judicial process. ' 9

Clearly, the broad latitude that the Court has given the Board
in freeing it from the rigid application of legal or administrative precedent allows the Board broad discretion in formulating administrative
decisions.
However, this does not mean that courts merely "rubber stamp" 20
Board decisions. Generally, if the Board's construction of the statute
is "reasonably defensible," a reviewing court may not reject it, even
if it has a preferred interpretation. 21 In fact, the Court has rejected
Board rulings where they had ''no reasonable basis in law, either
because the proper legal standard was not applied or because the Board
applied the correct standard but failed to give the plain language of
the standard its ordinary meaning." 22 Moreover, the Court has denied
a Board interpretation when that interpretation was "fundamentally
inconsistent with the structure of the Act" and when that interpretation in effect usurped "major policy decisions properly made by Congress." 23 Also, the Court has rejected any attempt by. the board to
move ''into a new area of regulation which Congress had not committed to it." 24
A recent case of the Court refusing to enforce a Board inter18. See supra note 11.
19. Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 265-66 (citing NLRB v. Seven-Up Co., 344 U.S.
344, 349 (1953)). See also NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 514
n. 6 (1979) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
20. Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 266.
21. Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 497 (1979) (citing NLRB v. Iron
Workers, 434 U.S. 335, 350 (1978)).
22. Ford Motor Co., 441 U.S. at 497 (citing Chemical and Alkali Workers
v. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 166 (1971)).
23. Ford Motor Co., 441 U.S. at 497 (citing American Ship Building Co. v.
NLRB, 380 U.S. at 300, 318)).
24. Ford Motor Co., 441 U.S. at 497 (citing NLRB v. Insurance Agents, 361
U.S. 477, 499 (1960)).
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pretation is NLRB v. Yeshiva University. 25 In Yeshiva, the NLRB
found that faculty members at Yeshiva University qualified under the
NLRA as "employees. " 26 The university maintained that the faculty
possessed enough indicia of "managerial status" sufficient to exclude
them from the NLRA's jurisdiction. 27 The Supreme Court agreed with
the university, holding that the Board's opinion lacked relevant findings
of fact. 28 In the absence of the Board's factual findings and in light
of the university's substantiation, the Court could not support the
Board. 29
Thus, as demonstrated in the Yeshiva case, while the Board has
great latitude, it is still held to standards and criteria that must be
met. As in Yeshiva, the Board must also substantiate its opinions
as well as simply interpret and apply them.
The circuits have been quick to pick up and illuminate the
Supreme Court's method of weighing Board decisions. In a 1981 case, 10
the Tenth Circuit indicated: "The role of the judiciary is narrow;
a Board order is reviewed for consistency with the Act and for
rationality, but if it satisfies these criteria, the Board's application
of the rule, if supported by substantial evidence on the record as a
whole, is to be enforced." 11 A 1983 Third Circuit concurring opinion
pointed out that it is mandated to enforce any order which is permissible under the Act, even if an alternate reading is possible. 12
25. 444 U.S. 672 (1980).
26. Id. at 678 (citing Yeshiva University, 221 N.L.R.B. 1053, 1054 (1975)).
27. NLRB v. Yeshiva University, 444 U.S. 672, 678 (1980).
28. Id. at 691.
29. The Court did drop an interesting footnote which illuminates the thinking
of the Court:
It is plain, for example, that professors may not be excluded merely because
they determine the content of their own courses, evaluate their own students,
and supervise their own research. There thus may be institutions of higher
learning unlike Yeshiva where the faculty are entirely or predominantly nonmanagerial. There also may be faculty members at Yeshiva and like universities who properly could be included in a bargaining unit. It may be that
a rational line could be drawn between tenured and untenured faculty
members, depending upon how a faculty is structured and operates. But
we express no opinion on these questions for it is clear that the unit approved
by the Board was far too broad.
444 U.S. at 690 n.31 (emphasis added).
30. NLRB v. American Can Company, 658 F.2d 746 (10th Cir. 1981).
31. Id. at 752-53 (emphasis added).
32. NLRB v. ARA Services, Inc., 717 F.2d 57, 70 (3rd Cir. 1983) (Adams,
J., concurring) (citing NLRB v. Transportation Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393
(I 983)). See also NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 236 (1963); Giacalone
v. NLRB, 682 F.2d 427, 430 (3d Cir. 1982).
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The First Circuit neatly capsulized the judicial review relationship to Board actions in its 1983 case, Friendly Ice Cream Corp. v.
NLRB. 33 The court noted:
We, as the reviewing court, are given the power to "enter a decree
enforcing, modifying, ... or setting aside in whole or in part" any order
of the Board .... Our role is not " 'to stand aside and rubber stamp'
Board determinations that run contrary to the language or tenor of
the Act." Rather, we must assure that the Board's unit determinations are not unreasonable, made arbitrarily or capriciously, or unsupported by substantial evidence. 34

The court then examined that judicial review essentially guards
against arbitrary decisionmaking by the Board. At the same time, the
court gives great deference to the particular expertise of the Board. 35
As the Supreme Court has explained, "the decision of the Board,
if not final, is rarely to be disturbed." 36
Thus, with the threshold question of the standard of judicial
review fairly well entrenched, the substantive questions stated in the
introduction of this article will be explored.
Ill.
A.

SUBSTANTIVE QUESTIONS RAISED BY WEINGARTEN

THE DEFINITION OF "REASONABLY BELIEVES"

Weingarten rights can only attach if an employee ''reasonably
believes" that disciplinary action is forthcoming or "reasonably believes
the investigation will result in disciplinary action .... " 37 The Court
adopted the view that "reasonableness" must be measured by objective standards and no inquiry into the subjective motivations of the
employee would be permitted. 38 This position seems to fly in the face
of logic. What an "employee believes" is clearly subjective. Even
though it may be based on objective criteria, it nonetheless remains
subject to the individual formulating the belief.
At least one post-Weingarten court has interpreted the Supreme
Court's test as emanating from the character of the "investigatory
interview.'' 39
33. 705 F.2d 570 (1st Cir. 1983).
34. Id. at 575 (citing Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 491
(1947). See also Pacific Southwest Airlines v. NLRB, 587 F.2d 1032, 1037 (9th Cir.
1978); NLRB v. Chicago Health & Tennis Clubs, Inc., 567 F.2d 331, 335 (7th Cir.
1977); Ochsner Clinic v. NLRB, 474 F.2d 206, 209 (5th Cir. I 973).
35. Friendly lee Cream Corp., 705 F.2d at 575.
36. Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 491 (1947).
37. Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 257.
38. Id. at 257 n.5.
39. Lennox Industries, Inc. v. NLRB, 637 F.2d 340, 344 (5th Cir. 1981)
(emphasis added).
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The Fifth Circuit interpretation changes ''what an employee
believes" to "what may be reasonable for an employee to believe
in light of the circumstances." The corollary inference is that the emphasis is not on what an employee actually believes but on what that
employee is justified in believing.
Indeed, courts have couched their conclusions in terminology that
points to this new, revised definition. In reviewing a Weingarten-like
situation with an IRS employee, the D.C. Circuit concluded that the
employee "could have reasonably feared" that disciplinary action
would result from what the employee actually believed was not relevant, and was beyond the scope of the court's inquiry according to
the Weingarten test. 40 Indeed, the Weingarten test precludes any other
approach. The dilemma is that the test really does not fit the requirement.• 1 What an employee "reasonably believes" requires some subjective inquiry. Such inquiry, however, is explicitly rejected.
B.

WHAT CONSTITUTES "CONCERTED ACTIVITY" FOR MUTUAL AID
OR PROTECTION

NLRB v. City Disposal Systems• 2 is a recent case which brings
greater certainty to the type of individual employee action protected
by the NLRA. A review of NLRB and appellate court decisions reveals
three major approaches to the protection of individual activity as "concerted activity" within the meaning of section 7 of the NLRA: I)
the approach that implies concert of action in certain circumstances;• 3
2) the approach that protects individual action looking forward to
group action; 44 and 3) the literal approach. 45
In City Disposal Systems the controversy involved a truck driver
who was fired because he refused to drive equipment he perceived
as unsafe. 46 The Supreme Court, reversing the Sixth Circuit and
upholding the NLRB, held that although undertaken individually the
safety complaint was based in a labor contract right and constituted
40. Internal Revenue Serv. etc. v. Federal Labor Relations Authority, 671 F.2d
560, 564 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
41. The rationale for the test, though, is solid. The Weingarten Court noted
[hat "a probe of an employee's subjective motivations ... would cause ... endless and
unreliable inquiry .... " Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 257 n.5 (citing NLRB v. Gissel Packing
Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969)).
42. 104 s. Ct. 1505 (1984).
43. Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 567 n.17 (1977) (survey of the appellate court cases).
44. Id. (citing Kellogg Co. v. NLRB, 457 F.2d 519, 522-23 (6th Cir. 1972)).
45. Eastex, 437 U.S. at 567 n.17 (citing NLRB v. Leslie Metal Arts Co., 509
F.2d 811 (6th Cir. 1975); Shelly & Anderson Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 497 F.2d 1200
(9th Cir. 1974)).
46. City Disposal, 104 S. Ct. at 1505.
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concerted activity protected under section 7 of the NLRA. 47 Unlike
the majority of the circuits, the Court does not view the reference
to "concerted activities" under section 7 as limiting language. Further,
the decision rejects the plain language argument by noting that all
the circuits have recognized that some individual activity falls within
section 7, such as when an employee acts as a representative for other
employees or attempts to induce employees to collective action.
The Weingarten Court only delves into a cursory discussion of
the requirement of "concerted activity for mutual aid or protection."
Moreover, that discussion pertains only to the particular facts of that
case. The Court notes:
The Board's holding is a permissible construction of "concerted
activities for. .. mutual aid or protection".... The action of an
employee in seeking to have the assistance of his union representative at a confrontation with his employer clearly falls within the
literal wording of § 7 that "[e]mployees shall have the right. .. to
engage in ... concerted activities for the purpose of. .. mutual aid or
protection. " 48

However, the Court was forced to consider this specific issue just
three years later in Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB. 49 In this case Eastex, Inc. 's
union employees sought to distribute a union newsletter to employees
in any of the company's "non-working'' areas. The company refused,
claiming that the union had other means by which to communicate
with employees. The union then filed an unfair practice charge with
the NLRB. The union asserted that the company was denying the
employees' right to act in concert for mutual aid or protection, a
right conferred by section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act.
"Because of apparent differences among the Courts of Appeals as
to the scope of rights protected by the 'mutual aid or protection'
clause of § 7 ... ," the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 50
In disputing the NLRB order, Eastex claimed that since the
newsletter dealt primarily with general political-labor issues and not
a "specific dispute between employees and their own employer," 51
then the language of section 7 would not apply. Moreover, Eastex
claimed ''that employees lose their protection under the 'mutual aid
or protection' clause when they seek to improve terms and condi47.
48.
842, 847
49.
50.
5 I.

Id. at 1516.
Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 260 (citing Mobil Oil Corp. v. NLRB, 482 F.2d
(7th Cir. 1973)).
437 U.S. 556 (1978).
Eastex, Inc. v. NLRB, 437 U.S. 556, 562 (1978).
Id. at 563 (emphasis added).
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tions of employment or otherwise improve their lot as employees
through channels outside [i.e. in this case, the public, political area]
the immediate employee-employer relationship. " 52
However, in enforcing the NLRB order, the Court disposed of
both of the contentions. Citing to a long line of cases, the court noted,
[l]t has been held that the "mutual aid or protection" clause protects employees from retaliation by their employers when they seek
to improve working conditions through resort to administrative and
judicial forums, and that employees' appeals to legislators to protect their interests as employees are within the scope of this clause. 53
(footnotes omitted).

Yet the Court held back and refused to commit itself to the question
of what specific activities may constitute "concerted" activities in the
instant context. 5 4 The Court would only go so far as to characterize
the distributing of a union newsletter as "concerted activity."
Nevertheless, the Court did admit that while "some concerted
activity bears a less immediate relationship" to the immediate employeeemployer relationship than other concerted activity, there is some point
where this "relationship becomes so attenuated so that it does not
fall within the 'mutual aid or protection' clause. " 55 But, in denying
Eastex's arguments, the Court refused to note when that point of
attenuation does or would occur. Instead, the Court ruled that this
determination rests, not with the Court, but better yet with the
NLRB. 56
52. Id. at 564-65.
53. Id. at 565-66 (footnotes omitted).
54. Id. at 566 n.15.
55. Id. at 567-68.
56. Id. at 568 (citing to Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. at 793;
Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 194 (1941)). Moreover, the Court dropped
an extensive, somewhat clarifying footnote:
See Ford Motor Co., 221 N.L.R.B. 663, 666 (1975), enforced, 546 F.2d
418 (CA3 1976) (holding distribution on employer's premises of a "purely
political tract" unprotected even though "the election of any political candidate may have an ultimate effect on employment conditions"); cf Ford
Motor Co. (Rouge Complex), 233 N.L.R.B. 698, 705 (1977) (decision of
Administrative Law Judge) (concession of General Counsel that distributions on employer's premises of literature urging participation in Revolutionary Communist Party celebration, and of Party's newspaper, were unprotected). The Board has not yet made clear whether it considers distributions like those in the above-cited cases to be unprotected altogether, or
only on employer premises.
In addition, even when concerted activity comes within the scope of
the "mutual aid or protection" clause, the forms such activity may permis-
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Despite the Supreme Court's clarification, albeit somewhat limited,
of the "concerted activity for mutual aid or protection" clause in
Eastex, Inc., considerable confusion remains. The Third and Ninth
Circuits found themselves at odds over the application of this language
in two recent cases concerning the same petitioners. In £./. du Pont
de Numours and Co., Inc. v. NLRB, 57 the Ninth Circuit denied
enforcement of an NLRB order which found that an employee's
Weingarten rights had been violated when that employee refused to
sign a monthly performance evaluation with a co-employee present
as a witness. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that "the request of the
single employee is not 'concerted activity'; it is the backdrop of other
group activity that transforms it into concerted action." 58 The court
noted that the employee admitted "that he did not seek a co-employee's
advice, but wanted someone around only to document du Pont' s position .... '' 59
The Third Circuit had a case almost on point with this Ninth
Circuit case. In E.J. du Pont de Numours and Co. (Chestnut Run)
v. NLRB, 60 the court of appeals held that a single employee's request
for a witness was indeed "concerted activity." 6 ' In alluding to the
Ninth Circuit's decision the court noted:
sibly take may well depend on the object of the activity. "The argument
that the employer's Jack of interest or control affords a legitimate basis
for holding that a subject does not come within 'mutual aid or protection'
is unconvincing. The argument that economic pressure should be unprotected
in such cases is more convincing." Getman, The protection of Economic
Pressure by Section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act,", 115 U. PA.
L. REV. 1195, 1221 (1967). Eastex, 437 U.S. at 556 n.18.
57. 707 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. I 983).
58. ld. at 1079.
59. ld.
60. 724 F.2d l061 (3rd Cir. 1983).
61. In determining "concerted activity" the court found:
In finding the Board's construction to be inconsistent with the Act, the Court
in Weingarten identified five justifications for the Board's decision. First,
the Court noted that although the employee alone has an immediate stake
in the outcome of the investigatory interview, nevertheless the union representation whose participation is sought would help safeguard the interests of
the entire bargaining unit by exercising vigilance over the fairness and uniformity of the employer's disciplinary practices. Second, the Court suggested
that the representative's presence provides an assurance to other workers
that they, too, can obtain such aid and protection if and when they need
it. Third, the Court stated that the presence of a representative serves the
most fundamental purposes of the Act in helping to eliminate and redress
the perceived imbalance of economic as well as of bargaining power between labor and management. Fourth, the presence of a representative could,
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We believe the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of Weingarten to be
foreclosed by the Supreme Court's expansive interpretation of Section 7 in the Weingarten opinion itself. In particular, the Court's
citation, apparently with approval, of Mobil Oil Corp. v. NLRB,
482 F.2d 842, 847 (7th Cir. 1973), cited at 420 U.S. at 260, 95 S.
Ct. at 965, suggests that the proper focus in evaluating the requirement of concertedness in this context should be on the literal nature
of the activity that would take place if the employee's request was
granted. 6 '

There was, however, one major factual difference between the
two cases. The Ninth Circuit's case was a "non-union" setting while
the Third Circuit's case was a "union" setting (i.e. requesting any
co-worker vis-a-vis a "union" representative). However, this is not
a crucial difference. As the Third Circuit noted:
Nowhere in the Weingarten opinion is its holding expressly
grounded on the existence of a union. Nor can it be suggested that
the Weingarten Court was unaware of the possible application of
its holding to a non-union context, for Justice Powell noted this
potential extension of the majority's analysis in his dissent. 420 U.S.
at 270 n. l, 95 S. Ct. at 969 n. l. Had the Weingarten majority wished
to limit its holding to the union setting, it could have done so
explicitly. 63

Nonetheless, this impasse between the circuits has become moot,
at least for now, since the Third Circuit's decision has been vacated
and remanded for other reasons at the request of the NLRB. 6 ' The
court, though, in remanding did take note of the potential conflict
with the Ninth Circuit. The court observed in a footnote:
It is noteworthy that a remand may very well lessen the ultimate
expenditure of judicial resources necessary to resolve the § 7 issue
in this case. Since our previous opinion enforcing the Board arguably
the Court found, assist a "fearful and inarticulate" employee to relate accurately the incident being investigated. This may prove particularly beneficial
to the employer, since by helping the parties to get to the bottom of the
incident more efficiently, valuable production time may be saved. Finally,
the Court recognized that the representative may be able, through informal
discussion and persuasion conducted at the threshold, to serve as the catalyst
in the amicable resolution of disputes, and, in the union context, be able
to discourage unjustified grievances. (citations omitted)
E.I. Dupont, 724 F.2d at 1065.
62. E.J. Dupont, 724 F.2d at !066.
63. Id. at 1065.
64. Id.
65. E.I. Dupont DeNemours & Co. v. NLRB, 733 F.2d 296, 298 n.2 (1984).
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conflicted with the Ninth Circuit's decision in E.I. Du Pont de
Nemours & Co. v. NLRB, 707 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1983), the
Supreme Court might have been impelled to grant certiorari in order
to announce uniform law on the subject. By remanding, we provide
the Board an opportunity to articulate an approach that could avoid
intercircuit conflict and obviate the need for Supreme Court review. 65

Absent a definitive ruling from the Supreme Court, the circuits
remain, at best, hesitant in setting forth a definite standard on "concerted activity for mutual aid or protection." The result is a
hodgepodge of circuit standards most of which, though, eventually
rely on the Board's discretion, which may indeed be the ultimate standard. 66·
C.

ROLE OF THE REQUESTED REPRESENTATIVE

The Weingarten Court specifically adopted the Board's rationale
that first, "[t]he employer has no obligation to justify his refusal to
allow union representation, and despite refusal, the employer is free
to carry on his inquiry without interviewing the employee ... ," 67 and
second, "the employer has no duty to bargain with any union representative who may be permitted to attend the investigatory interview. " 68
Thus, the question becomes ''what can the representative do other
than serve as a witness?" The Court suggested that a union representative could elicit favorable facts, thus saving the employer production time. 69
However, there is no delineation between these two positions (i.e.
no duty to bargain with representative; representative as an assist to
investigatory process) as to what is suggested and what is required.
The Fifth Circuit recognized this possible contradiction by commenting that
[t]he court outlined the "contours and limits" of the right to union
representation ... noting among them that [t]he employer has no duty
to bargain with the union representative at an investigatory interview." In its very next breath, however, the Court defined the role
of the union representative by quoting from the Board's brief:

66. See, e.g., Roadway Express, Inc. v. NLRB, 700 F.2d 687 (11th Cir. 1983);
Royal Development Co., Ltd. v. NLRB, 703 F.2d 363 (9th Cir. 1983); Inter-Mountain
Rural Electric Ass'n v. NLRB, 732 F.2d 754 (10th Cir. 1984). See generally, Gorman
and Finkin, The Individual and the Requirement of "Concert" Under the National
Labor Relalions Act, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 286 (1981).
67. Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 258 (emphasis added).
68. Id. at 259.
69. Id. at 263.
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"The representative is present to assist the employee, and may attempt to clarify facts or suggest other employees who may have
knowledge of them. The employer, however, is free to insist that
he is only interested, at that time, in hearing the employee's own
account of the matter under investigation. "' 0

The fact situations confronting the Fifth Circuit were all Weingarten situations wherein the company refused the union representative any role in the investigatory interview other than as silent witness,
despite the representatives' attempts to assist and participate at the
employees' requests. The court precludes this kind of company action by holding that "put simply, the union representative is there
to help the employee in his effort to vindicate himself... [the company cannot have reasonably read Weingarten] ... to leave open the
possibility that the employer might foreclose the union representative
from any participation .... "" In a footnote the court stated that "a
silent observer offers little in the way of 'aid and protection."' 72
In citing to NLRB v. Texaco, lnc., 73 a Ninth Circuit case, the
Fifth Circuit reasoned that Texaco simply recognized that interpreting
Weingarten to preclude representative participation is contrary to other
language in Weingarten where the court speaks of an active role to
be taken by the representative. 74
However, many times the role of the union representative or any
co-employee is simply to be a "silent witness," particularly in the
context of disciplinary action. In those cases, Weingarten applicability
hinges on whether the interview is investigatory or purely disciplinary.
D.

WHAT CONSTITUTES AN INVESTIGATORY INTERVIEW

The Weingarten Court did not go beyond the plain language of
"an investigatory interview which he the employee reasonably believes
may result in the imposition of discipline .... " 75 However, the NLRB
did differentiate between an investigatory hearing (i.e. a meeting to
elicit facts or information) and a disciplinary hearing (i.e. a hearing
designed to reprimand, suspend, or terminate an employee). In Baton
Rouge Water Works Co.,' 6 the employee was reaching the end of
70.
1984).
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

NLRB v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 730 F.2d 166, 168-69 (5th Cir.

Id. at 172.
Id. at 172 n.6.
659 F.2d 124 (9th Cir. 1981).
730 F.2d at 172 (citing NLRB v. Texaco, 659 F.2d 124, 126 (9th Cir. 1981)).
Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 262.
246 N.L.R.B. 995 (1979).
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her probationary employment period. Her supervisors believed that
she was not "working out" and decided to terminate her at the conclusion of the probationary period. At the meeting in which the supervisor informed the employee of her termination, the employee requested
a union representative. The request was denied and as a result the
employee filed a grievance which resulted in the NLRB hearing. 77
The employee maintained that her Weingarten rights had been
violated. In response, the Board found that a union representative
only serves a legitimate purpose when information is being elicited
from the employee. However, in a meeting that only informs the
employee of action upon a previous disciplinary decision Weingarten
was held not to apply. 78 Nevertheless, the Board did issue the following caveat:
We stress that we are not holding today that there is no right to
the presence of a union representative at any "disciplinary" interview. Indeed, if the employer engages in any conduct beyond merely
informing the employee of a previously made disciplinary decision,
the full panoply of protections accorded the employee under Weingarten may be applicable. Thus, for example, were the employer
to inform the employee of a disciplinary action and then seek facts
or evidence in support of that action, or to attempt to have the
employee admit his alleged wrongdoing or to sign a statement to
that effect, or to sign statements relating to such matters as
workmen's compensation, such conduct would remove the meeting
from the narrow holding of the instant case, and the employee's
right to union representation would attach. In contrast, the fact that
the employer and employee thereafter engaged in a conversation at
the employee's behest or instigation concerning the reasons for the
previously determined discipline will not, alone, convert the meeting
to an interview at which the Weingarten protects apply. 79

The Fifth Circuit picked up this NLRB decision, referred to as
the Baton Rouge Water Works exception, but put it in a slightly different perspective. In Anchortank, Inc. v. NLRB, 80 the Fifth Circuit
adopted the Baton Rouge Water Works exception, but instead of
treating it as a separate Weingarten requirement, ruled that concerted
activity for mutual aid or protection is not implicated when the interview does nothing except inform the employee of a previous disciplinary
decision. 81 The Fifth Circuit went on to say that it is crucial for the
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

Id. at 997.
Id.
Id.
618 F.2d 1153 (5th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 1168.

WEINGARTEN STANDARDS

1986:81]

95

Board and Court to know exactly what went on at "the meeting."
Without such knowledge, it is impossible to ''characterize the interview as 'disciplinary' or 'investigatory." ' 82
Although the courts have addressed the four immediate questions
posed by Weingarten, they have done so only rudimentarily and with
some confusion and hesitancy. Amidst this confusion, two 1983 cases
have shown the rigor which courts must use in applying the Weingarten
standards.
IV.

APPLICATION OF WEINGARTEN

The Fifth Circuit was presented with what it described as "a close
case" and one in which "we might reach a different conclusion if
we were deciding the question in the first instance ... " in Gulf State
Manufacturing, Inc. v. NLRB. 83 The Weingarten issue developed when
Vincent Scott, a Gulf States employee, left work early without notifying
his supervisor. Scott maintained that the early departure was
necessitated by his need for back medication that he had forgotten
at home. Scott had been disciplined once before for refusing a work
assignment due to dizziness caused by the back medication.
The next day, Scott was summoned by the production manager.
On route to the meeting, Scott asked his supervisor if the union president, a co-worker, could be present at the meeting with the production manager. Scott was told that this was not possible since the company was not bargaining with the union. 84
At the meeting, the production manager, with Scott's supervisor
also present, told Scott that he was being given a written disciplinary
notice for his leaving early the day before. Scott protested, gave his
reasons for leaving, and claimed that the company was anti-union.
Scott was then given the disciplinary notice. The meeting ended. At
no time during the meeting did Scott request union representation. 85
In the subsequent unfair labor practice proceeding, the
administrative law judge found that Scott's request for union represen-

82. Id. at 1167-69.
83. 704 F.2d 1390, 1395 (5th Cir. 1983).
84. The Fifth Circuit noted this event with the following footnote: "The Company and the Union did not have any bargaining sessions between late 1977 and
October 1980. (Scott's meeting with the production manager was Feb. 13, 1980.)
We note, however, that Eaves' (the supervisor's) response was inappropriate: contract bargaining and Weingarten representation are not related functions .... " 704
F.2d at 1392 n.l.
85. Id. at 1392-93.
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tation fell within the Baton Rouge Water Works Co. 86 exception since
Scott's meeting with the production manager "was solely for the purpose of imposing previously-determined discipline. " 87 Thus Weingarten
rights did not attach.
In the proceedings before the NLRB and eventually the Fifth Circuit, Gulf States also argued that since Scott did not make his request known to the production manager himself, he did not invoke
his Weingarten right for union representation. However, as the court
noted, the facts were clear that Scott requested union representation
from his supervisor and his supervisor was present at the meeting.
The Fifth Circuit noted:
In Lennox, we held that an employee had sufficiently invoked
his Weingarten right when the supervisor to whom the request was
made was present at the interview, even though the company official
who conducted the interview was unaware of the request and the
supervisor to whom the request was made did not know what the
full scope of the interview would be. Here the supervisor was present throughout Scott's meeting with the production manager; thus,
under Lennox, Scott's request. .. was sufficient to give rise to a Weingarten right. 88

However, the company also argued that the Baton Rouge Water
Works Co. exception should be applicable. In Baton Rouge, the NLRB
held that no section 7 right to the presence of a union representative
existed at a meeting held solely to inform the employee of a previously
made disciplinary decision. 89
While Scott's meeting with the production manager seems to fit
into the NLRB's Weingarten exception the NLRB has clearly indicated
that this exception is to be narrowly construed. In fact, the NLRB
pointed out further along in the Baton Rouge Water Works Co. case,
[I]f the employer engages in any conduct beyond merely informing
the employee of a previously made disciplinary decision ... [then]
Weingarten may be applicable ... [W]ere the employer to inform the
employee of a disciplinary action and then seek facts or evidence
in support of that action ... ,such conduct would remove the meeting
from the narrow holding of the instant case .... ' 0

Both the administrative law judge as well as the NLRB found
86. 246 N.L.R.B. 995 (1979), enforced in Anchortank, Inc. v. NLRB, 618 F.2d
1153, 1166-68 (5th Cir. 1980).
87. Gulf States Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 704 F.2d 1390, 1393 (5th Cir. 1983).
88. Id. at 1394.
89. Id. at 1394-95.
90. 246 N.L.R.B. at 997 (emphasis added).
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that the production manager had asked Scott, during the course of
the "disciplinary hearing," why he had left without informing a supervisor. This question, seemingly, is enough to invalidate the Baton
Rouge Water Works Co. exception since the employer was seeking
"facts or evidence in support of [the disciplinary] action .... " 91 The
NLRB agreed, reversing the administrative law judge; the Fifth Circuit affirmed, somewhat hesitantly, by holding
[w]hile this is a close case, and we might reach a different conclusion if we were deciding the question in the first instance, the
[NLRB's] interpretation of the conversation [between Scott and the
production manager] is clearly a permissible one .... Scott did instigate
the conversation, but the resulting discussion was not confined to
an explanation of the reasons for the decision to discipline him,
rather, the Board could and did find that the [production manager]
sought evidence to justify the discipline. 92

The Sixth Circuit was presented with a similar situation in ITT
Lighting Fixtures v. NLRB. 93 ITT Lighting Fixtures, a Mississippibased manufacturing plant, was opposed to an employee unionization campaign. However, in the resulting union election, the UAW
won by just twenty-two votes out of approximately three-hundred and
forty employees. The company contested the election and refused to
bargain with the UAW. During the pendency of the election campaign, a pro-union employee, Terry Williams, left his shift one-half
hour early in order to distribute leaflets at the main gate while the
on-coming shift was reporting for work.
Williams was called before the personnel administrator and two
other supervisors the next day and questioned about his unauthorized
leave. Williams asked to have another employee present; he was denied
this. Williams then refused to answer any questions and was given,
at the conclusion of the meeting, 94 a three day suspension.
ITT contended that Weingarten was not applicable to Williams'
situation. The company claimed that the decision to suspend Williams
had been made prior to the meeting. The court, however, following
the same line of logic as the Fifth Circuit in Gulf States Manufacturing Inc., held that any attempt to elicit further information from the

91. Id.
92. Gulf States, 704 F.2d at 1395.
93. 719 F.2d 851 (6th Cir. 1983).
94. The court notes however that "there is conflicting testimony as to whether
the managers notified Williams of his suspension at the meeting described above,
possibly even before the questioning began, or at a second meeting later that morning."
Id. at 853 n. l.
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employee pertaining to an even pre-decided disciplinary action triggers
a Weingarten situation. Citing the NLRB v. Texaco, Inc., the court
held that because the meeting was investigatory, the fact that the decision was previously made was of no consequence. 95 The court also
clarified that
had the meeting with Williams included only the notification of the
suspension, we would agree with the company that Weingarten does
not apply here. However, even if we accept the Company's version
of the sequence of events-that Williams was notified of the suspension prior to the questioning-we still find a Weingarten violation.
It is clear from the record that the managers wished to elicit further
information pertaining to the suspension. 96

It then seems irrelevant that Williams refused to answer or that
the managers failed to get any further information concerning Williams'
actions. The conclusion i s that if any questioning of the employee
occurs during a disciplinary meeting, regardless of its sequential relationship with the nature of discipline and regardless of the employee's
answers or failure to answer, the meeting becomes an investigatory
one and Weingarten rights can attach. 97
Nevertheless, ITT also maintained that Weingarten was not
applicable to Williams' situation since there was no certified union
to call upon for representation. The company claimed that Weingarten
simply did not apply when there was no union involvement. 98
However, the court sidesteps this potential hurdle by pointing
out Williams' union activities, the pendency of union certification,
and the tentative approval of the union by the employees.
Finally, ITT maintained that Weingarten was not applicable to
Williams' situation because Williams requested a fellow employee only
as a potential corroborating witness, not as a "representative" to
safeguard Williams' rights. ITT claimed that Weingarten "envisioned
95. Id. at 853 (citing NLRB v. Texaco, Inc., 659 F.2d 124 (9th Cir. 1981)).
96. ITT Lighting Fixtures v. NLRB, 719 F.2d 851, 853 (6th Cir. 1983).
97. Weingarten rights are not self-executing. There must be a request by the
employee. In Weingarten, the Supreme Court adopted the NLRB's rationale in Mobil
Oil Corp., 196 N.L.R.B. 1052 (1972): "[T)he right to representation arises only in
situations where the employee requests representation .... " Weingarten, 420 U.S. at
257 (emphasis added).
98. While the courts may hesitate on this issue, the NLRB has not. In Materials
Research Corp., 262 N.L.R.B. 1010 (1982), the Board held that nonunion employees
have the right to representation at an investigatory interview. See Stickler, Limitations on an Employer's Rights to Discipline and Discharge Employees, 9 EMPL. REL.
L.J. 70 (1983). See also Herron, Investigation of Employee Misconduct-Must the
Union Be There?, 3 EMPL. REL L.J. 255 (1977).
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active participation by the union representative in aid of the
employee ... ," not merely "a witness to corroborate his version of
what happened in a later grievance procedure. " 99
The court agreed that Williams' sole interest may have been in
having a corroborating witness. 100 However, there is nothing at all
improper with this motive. The court indicated that "the Supreme
Court implied in Weingarten that one advantage of allowing the
employee to be represented at an investigatory confrontation was to
assure that the employee would enjoy 'recourse to the safeguards of
the Act."'' 0 ' The court then summarily dismissed ITT's contention
by concluding that Williams did indeed have a valid concern in requesting the union representative. The court recognized that Williams
sought t o protect himself from any negative consequences of his prounion activity. 102
Ironically, though, the court made no mention of the seemingly
legitimate concern that ITT had with Williams' leaving without
authorization, the reason for the meeting in the first place. It does
not appear to be contested that Williams indeed left work early without
authority. Yet, it seems that this valid concern is put aside in light
of the company's failure to afford Williams his Weingarten rights.
It is not noted, however, what final determination the NLRB took
in regard to Williams' suspension. The NLRB ruling was simply
enforced.
V.

REMEDIES

An open question, remains, concerning what remedy(ies) is
appropriate in light of a Weingarten violation.
Clearly, if an employer conducts investigatory hearings without
affording Weingarten rights to the employees, the Board may issue

99. ITT Lighting Fixtures, 719 F.2d at 854 (emphasis added). The court,
apparently bothered by the Company's contention, further supports its "concerted
activity" finding by citing a number of similar circumstances: NLRB v. Columbia
University, 541 F.2d 922 (2d Cir. 1976), where the Second Circuit decided that a
request for a non-union employee representative to be present was protected under
Weingarten. A crucial fact in that case was that the employees involved in Columbia
University had a history of group activity protesting various workplace rules, although
they were not formally organized as a union. See also Anchortank, Inc. v. NLRB,
618 F.2d ll53 (5th Cir. 1980), where the court held that an employee's request for
another employee's presence is, in itself, "concerted activity" and thus satisfying
of that particular Weingarten requirement. Id. at 854-56.
100. ITT Lighting Fixtures, 719 F.2d at 853.
101. Id. (citing Weingarten, 420 U.S. at 262).
102. ITT lighting Fixtures, 719 F .2d at 856.
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and a court enforce a "cease and desist" order. However, if an
employee is indeed disciplined as a result of the investigatory hearing, what status should the Board and subsequently the court afford
the discipline? The fact in Weingarten did not at all address this
issue. 1 01 However, the Supreme Court did address a comparable issue
in International Ladies' Garment Workers Union v. Quality Manufacturing Co. 1 04 The Court ruled that the firing of two employees was
directly related to those employees' insisting upon their statutory rights
under the NLRA. Thus, reinstatement and back pay was the
appropriate remedy. This ruling is the natural corollary to the preWeingarten decision in Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB 105
in which the Court noted that "[t]he legislative history of the NLRA
was designed to preclude the Board from reinstating an individual
who had been discharged because of misconduct." 106
This rationale has been adopted and summarized as this general
rule: "While the Board had broad authority to restore the status quo
and make whole any losses suffered by the employees because of unfair labor practice, ... it does not have the power to order reinstatement or back pay for employees discharged for obvious personal
misconduct. ... " 101

103. The employee was not disciplined due to the confusion of company policy;
company policy was subsequently changed and clarified.
104. 420 U.S. 276 (1975).
105. 379 U.S. 203 (1964).
106. Id. at 217. The Court supported this conclusion by footnoting the following:
The House Report states that the provision was "intended to put an end
to the belief, now widely held and certainly justified by the Board's decision, that engaging in union activities carries with it a license to loaf, wander
about the plants, refuse to work, waste time, break rules, and engage in
incivilities and other disorders and misconduct." H.R. Rep. No. 245, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess., 42 (1947). The Conference Report notes that under lO(c)
'employees who are discharged or suspended for interfering with other
employees at work, whether or not in order to transact union business, or
for engaging in activities, whether or not union activities, contrary to shop
rules, or for Communist activities, or for other cause [interfering with war
production] ... will not be entitled to reinstatement.' H.R. Conf. Ref. No.
510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 55 (1947).
Fiberboard Paper Products, 379 U.S. at 217 n.11.
107. NLRB v. Potter Electric Signal Co., 600 F.2d 120, 124 (8th Cir. 1979)
(citing Hinson v. NLRB, 428 F.2d 133, 136 (8th Cir. 1970)). In Potter Electric Signal,
the court in denying the Board's enforcement of employee reinstatement and back
pay, found that "[t]he record is clear that the employees were not discharged for
requesting union assistance ... the employees were discharged for a fight that resulted
in shutting down the production line .... " Id. at 123 (emphasis added).
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In Montgomery Ward and Co. v. NLRB 108 the Eighth Circuit
reviewed a Board order to reinstate two Wards employees who had
been discharged for admittedly stealing goods from Wards. 109 Wards
had failed to provide requested union representation to the two when
Ward supervisors interviewed them at the investigatory meeting. Upon
review, the Board issued a "cease and desist" order as well as an
order to reinstate and issue back pay to the two employees. The court
agreed with the Board at least in regard to the "cease and desist"
order. The court held that the board was correct in finding that the
employees were improperly denied union representation at the investigation interviews. 11 0 However, the court refused to enforce the reinstatement and back pay order since "the employees affected their own
discharge by stealing not by asking for union representation." 111
A further elaboration on this rule was developed by the Seventh
Circuit in NLRB v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 112 a case in which
an employee was discharged for alleged dishonest toll-call billings.
However, it was unclear where the company received its information
concerning the dishonesty. There were allusions in the record that
the employee's "discharge was not based solely upon her written statement which was obtained during the unlawful interview." 113 However,
during that investigatory meeting, the employee rightfully asked for
a union representative and was denied. Thus, this court implied that
if the discharge was indeed premised upon a written statement obtained
at an unfair investigatory meeting, then the discharge itself would
be illegal. Therefore, in this case, the court remanded the case back
to the Board to determine whether evidence gathered outside the investigatory meeting existed to support the discharge.
This approach is consistent with the Board's own 1980 ruling
in Kraft Foods, Inc. 114 which held that once an investigatory interview is held contrary to Weingarten rights, then the employer must
show that "its decision to discipline the employee in question was
not based on information obtained at the unlawful interview.'' 115
Yet, the Ninth Circuit, without elaboration, has held that the
Board's interpretation in Kraft Foods, Inc. is incorrect and unen108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

664
Id.
Id.
Id.
674
Id.
251
Id.

F.2d 1095 (8th Cir. 1981).
at 1096.
at 1096-97.
F.2d 618 (7th Cir. 1982).
at 623.
N.L.R.B. 598 (1980).
at 598.
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forceable. 116 The Ninth Circuit found that the NLRA does not permit such a construction. Thus, the standards imposed by the Seventh
Circuit in Illinois Bell seem to conflict with the Ninth Circuit's
standards. Again, the circuits have no guidance and must construct
criteria in a makeshift manner.
The Weingarten tests, standards and criteria have been created
by the Supreme Court. However, actual interpretation and application have been left to the circuits. Until the Supreme Court resolves
these differences or until the circuits accept the Board's ruling carte
blanche, an unlikely event, then these makeshift standards will continue to create inconsistent rulings within the circuits in applying and
interpreting Weingarten rights.

116. Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. NLRB, 711 F.2d 134, 137-38 (9th
Cir. 1983).

